Interpretation of Statutes

A statute has been defined as "the will of the legislature" (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th ed. p. 1). Normally, it denotes the Act enacted by the legislature.

A statute is thus a written "will" of the legislature expressed according to the form necessary to constitute it as a law of the State, and rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities. (Crawford, p. 1)

According to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, a statute is "a law established by the act of the legislative power, i.e., an Act of the legislature. The written will of the legislature. The term 'statute' is generally applied to laws and regulations of every sort, law which ordains, permits or prohibits anything which is designated as a statute, without considering from what source it arises".

The Constitution of India does not use the term 'statute' but it employs the term "law"

to describe an exercise of legislative power.

Statutes are commonly divided into following classes:

1.Codifying, when they codify the unwritten law on a subject;

2.Declaratory, when they do not profess to make any alteration in the existing law, but merely declare or explain what it is;

3.Remedial, when they alter the common law, or the judge made (non-statutory)

law;

4.Amending, when they alter the statute law;

5.Consolidating, when they consolidate several previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, with or without alternations of substance;

6.Enabling, when they remove a restriction or disability;

7.Disabling or restraining, when they restrain the alienation of property;

8.Penal, when they impose a penalty or forfeiture.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2023, Q. 2(b) (Syllabus 2017).

The maxim contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege means that a contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law. Where the words used in a statute have undergone alteration in meaning in course of time, the words will be construed to bear the same meaning as they had when the statute was passed on the principle expressed in the maxim. In simple words, old statutes should be interpreted as they would have been at the date when they were passed and prior usage and interpretation by those who have an interest or duty in enforcing the Act, and the legal profession of the time, are presumptive evidence of their meaning when the meaning is doubtful.

But if the statute appears to be capable of only interpretation, the fact that a wrong meaning had been attached to it for many years, will be immaterial and the correct meaning will be given by the Courts except when title to property may be affected or when every day transactions have been entered into on such wrong interpretation.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2024, Q. 6(b) (Syllabus 2017).

The position in the Indian Constitution is different from other Federal Constitutions in respect of distribution of legislative powers. There is no clear-cut division of powers between the Union and States. Thus, in case of conflict, the judiciary has to make reconciliation attempts between the conflicting entries. Different entries in the different lists are to be interpreted in such a way that a conflict between them is avoided and each of them is given effect.

It must be accepted that the Constitution does not want to create conflict and make any entry nugatory. Therefore, whenever there appears a conflict between the two entries in two different lists, it is the court’s duty to reconcile entries and to bring harmony between them, so that each of them is given effect and, for that purpose the scope and meaning of one may be restricted so as to give meaning to the other also. This can be achieved by applying the principle of harmonious construction in such cases.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2025, Q. 1(a)(iv) (Syllabus 2022).

Where in an enactment, there are two provisions which cannot be reconciled, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both. This is what is known as the “rule of harmonius construction”.

The rule may be understood with the help of below mentioned cases:

A statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid “a head on clash” between two sections of the same Act and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construct provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise” (Raj Krishna v. Pinod Kanungo, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 202 at 203).

The Supreme Court applied this rule in resolving a conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus [Article 25(2)(b)]. (Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255).

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2023, Q. 2(b) (Syllabus 2017).

The principle of harmonious construction is similar to the idea of broad or purposive approach. The key to this method of Constitutional interpretation is that provisions of the Constitution should be harmoniously interpreted. Constitutional provisions should not be construed in isolation from all other parts of the Constitution, but should be construed as to harmonize with those other parts. A provision of the Constitution must be construed and considered as part of the Constitution and it should be given a meaning and an application which does not lead to conflict with other Articles and which confirms with the Constitution’s general scheme. When there are two provisions in a statute, which are in apparent conflict with each other, they should be interpreted such that effect can be given to both and that construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted except in the last resort.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2018, Q. 2A(iii) (Syllabus 2017).

"Ejusdem Generis" literally means “of the same kind or species”. The ejusdem generis rule is that, where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words following particular and specific words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified, unless there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose. It is merely a rule of construction to aid the Courts to find out the true intention of the Legislature. To apply the rule the following conditions must exist:

(1)The statute contains an enumeration by specific words,

(2)The members of the enumeration constitute a class,

(3)The class is not exhausted by the enumeration,

(4)A general term follows the enumeration,

(5)There is a distinct genus which comprises more than one species, and

(6)There is no clearly manifested intent that the general term be given a broader meaning that the doctrine requires.

The rule of ejusdem generis must be applied with great caution because, it implies a departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning or supposed intention of the legislature.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2019, Q. 4(c) (Syllabus 2017).

Ejusdem Generis, literally means “of the same kind or species”.

Ejusdem generis rule is that, where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words following particular and specific words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified, unless there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose. It is merely a rule of construction to aid the Courts to find out the true intention of the Legislature (Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1033). To apply the rule the following conditions must exist:

(1)The statute contains an enumeration by specific words,

(2)The members of the enumeration constitute a class,

(3)The class is not exhausted by the enumeration,

(4)A general term follows the enumeration,

(5)There is a distinct genus which comprises more than one species, and

(6)There is no clearly manifested intent that the general term be given a broader meaning that the doctrine requires. (See Thakura Singh v. Revenue Minister, AIR 1965 J & K 102)

In short, the rule of ejusdem generis must be applied with great caution because, it implies a departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning or supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be controlled by the fundamental rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be accomplished. The rule requires that specific words are all of one genus, in which case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2022, Q. 6(a) (Syllabus 2017).

The rule “Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterius” means that express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.

At the same time, general words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless there is in the statute some ground for limiting and restraining their meaning by reasonable construction; because many things are put into a statute ex abundanti cautela, and it is not to be assumed that anything not specifically included is for that reason alone excluded from the protection of the statute. The method of construction according to this maxim must be carefully watched. The failure to make the ‘expressio’ complete may arise from accident. Similarly, the ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence or accident because it never struck the draftsman that the thing supposed to be excluded requires specific mention. The maxim ought not to be applied when its application leads to inconsistency or injustice.

Similarly, it cannot be applied when the language of the Statute is plain with clear meaning (Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC 801)

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2020, Q. 4(d) (Syllabus 2017).

Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterius The rule means that express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. At the same time, general words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless there is in the statute some ground for limiting and restraining their meaning by reasonable construction; because many things are put into a statute ex abundanti cautela, and it is not to be assumed that anything not specifically included is for that reason alone excluded from the protection of the statute. The method of construction according to this maxim must be carefully watched. The failure to make the ‘expressio’ complete may arise from accident. Similarly, the ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence or accident because it never struck the draftsman that the thing supposed to be excluded requires specific mention. The maxim ought not to be applied when its application leads to inconsistency or injustice.

Similarly, it cannot be applied when the language of the Statute is plain with clear meaning.

(Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC 801)

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2024, Q. 4(a) (Syllabus 2022).

Apart from the intrinsic aids, such as preamble and purview of the Act, the Court can consider resources outside the Act, called the extrinsic aids, in interpreting and finding out the purposes of the Act. Where the words of an Act are clear and unambiguous, no resource to extrinsic matter, even if it consists of the sources of the codification, is permissible. But where it is not so, the Court can consider, apart from the intrinsic aids, such as preamble and the purview of the Act, both the prior events leading up to the introduction of the Bill, out of the which the Act has emerged, and subsequent events from the time of its introduction until its final enactment like the legislation, history of the Bill, Select Committee reports. The Supreme Court, enunciated the rule of exclusion of Parliamentary history in the way it is enunciated by English Courts, but on many occasions, the Court used this aid in resolving questions of construction. The report of a Select Committee or other Committee on whose report an enactment is based, can be looked into "so as to see the background against which the legislation was enacted.

When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. Use of foreign decisions of countries following the same system of jurisprudence as ours and rendered on statutes in pari materia has been permitted by practice in Indian Courts.

Few external aids in the interpretation of statutes are:

1.Parliamentary History The Supreme Court, enunciated the rule of exclusion of Parliamentary history in the way it is enunciated by English Courts, but on many occasions, the Court used this aid in resolving questions of construction.

2.Reference to Reports of Committees The report of a Select Committee or other Committee on whose report an enactment is based, can be looked into "so as to see the background against which the legislation was enacted.

3.Reference to other Statutes It has already been stated that a statute must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their context. Extension of this rule of context, permits reference to other statutes in pari materia, i.e. statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same system.

4.Dictionaries When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance.

5.Use of Foreign Decisions Use of foreign decisions of countries following the same system of jurisprudence as ours and rendered on statutes in pari materia has been permitted by practice in Indian Courts.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2021, Q. 6A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

The General Clauses Act, 1897 is a consolidating Act. It consolidates the General Clauses Act, 1868 and the General Clauses Act, 1887. The General Clauses Act, 1897 has been enacted with the aim and objective to provide one single statute as a composite structure in defining different provisions as regards to the interpretation of words and legal principles which would better placed to be defined for the general application for various rules and regulations.

The General Clauses Act, 1897 contains 'definitions' of some words and also some general principles of interpretation. The General Clauses Act is very operational in the absence of clear definition in the specific enactments and in the construction or interpretation of statute. The Act gives a clear suggestion for the conflicting provisions and differentiates the legislation according to the commencement and enforcement to avoid uncertainty.

This Act also defines certain words or expressions so that there is no unnecessary repetition of definition of those words in other Acts. It also provides a set of rules which regulate certain aspects of operation of other enactments. The definitions of General Clauses Act, 1987 are applicable to all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2021, Q. 2A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

The facts of the question clearly indicates that Municipal Governance Act, 2010 provides the General provisions and Heritage Sites Preservations Act, 2012 provides the Special provisions for levy of taxes to the properties.

This case attracts the well-known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. This rule is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them, his intention is that, the latter directions should prevail as regards all the rest of the earlier directions and should have effect.

It is the duty of the courts to avoid such repugnancy and wherever it is possible, construe provisions in such manner that they harmonise. Provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect re-conciliation between them.

This principle is expressed in the Latin maxim Generalia specialibus non derogant (also known as the rule of implied exception) meaning general things do not derogate from special things; things general do not restrict or detract from things special. This well-known proposition of law says that when a matter falls under any specific provision, then it must be governed by that provision and not by the general provision. The general provisions must admit to the specific provisions of law. It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation.

Therefore, the special law will override the general law in matters relating to heritage properties.

The municipal authorities’ action of levying tax under the general act is legally unsustainable, as it ignores the specific exemption provided in the later and special legislation. The tax demand imposed on the heritage trust is thus invalid.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2025, Q. 2(a) (Syllabus 2022).

The Court shall apply the rule of construction that 'general provisions yield to special provisions'. It is the duty of the Court to avoid that and, whenever it is possible to do so, the construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonize. Provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect re-conciliation.

This principle is also expressed in the Latin maxim Generalia specialibus non derogant (also known as the rule of implied exception) meaning general things do not derogate from special things; things general do not restrict or detract from things special; universal things do not detract from specific things. This well-known proposition of law says that when a matter falls under any specific provision, then it must be governed by that provision and not by the general provision. The general provisions must admit to the specific provisions of law.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2023, Q. 6A(i) (Syllabus 2022).

Heydon’s rule of Interpretation of Statutes In Heydon’s Case, in [1584] [76 ER 637 360 REP 7a], it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discerned and considered:

(1)What was the Common Law before the making of the Act;

(2)What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not provide;

(3)What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; and

(4)The true reason of the remedy.

Although judges are unlikely to propound formally in their judgments the four questions in Heydon’s Case, consideration of the “mischief” or “object” of the enactment is common and will often provide the solution to a problem of interpretation. Therefore, when the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions, the most firmly established rule for construction of such words is the rule laid down in Heydon’s case which has “now attained the status of a classic”. The rule directs that the Courts must adopt that construction which “shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”.

But this does not mean that a construction should be adopted which ignores the plain natural meaning of the words or disregard the context and the collection in which they occur.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2022, Q. 2(b) (Syllabus 2017).

The case situation attracts the mischief rule or the Heydon’s rule. In Heydon’s Case, in [1584] [76 ER 637 360 REP 7a], it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer that, for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discerned and considered:

(1)What was the Common Law before the making of the Act;

(2)What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not provide;

(3)What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; and

(4)The true reason of the remedy.

Although judges are unlikely to propound formally in their judgments the four questions in Heydon’s Case, consideration of the “mischief” or “object” of the enactment is common and will often provide the solution to a problem of interpretation. Therefore, when the material words in question are ambiguous and are capable of bearing two or more constructions, the most firmly established rule for construction of such words is the rule laid down in Heydon’s case.

The rule directs that the Courts must adopt that construction which “shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. (Umed Singh v. Raj Singh, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 43)

Thus, under the Mischief Rule (Heydon’s Case), courts must consider the defect (mischief) in the previous law and interpret the statute to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

In Umed Singh v. Raj Singh, the Court emphasized purposive interpretation, especially in beneficial legislation like tenancy laws, to protect weaker sections.

In the given situation, we can say that the law aims to protect tenants from eviction as it is a beneficial legislation. Evicting Mohan would defeat the purpose of the statute. Even if wording is ambiguous, interpretation should favour tenant protection. Mohan is entitled to protection, as the statute must be interpreted to advance its beneficial object.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2026, Q. 4(a) (Syllabus 2022).

"Illustrations attached to sections are part of the statute and they are useful so far as they help to furnish same indication of the presumable intention of the legislature. An explanation is at times appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in the section. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. But illustrations cannot have the effect of modifying the language of the section and they cannot either curtail or expand the ambit of the section which alone forms the enactment. The meaning to be given to an 'explanation' must depend upon its terms, and 'no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used." (Lalla Ballanmal v.

Ahmad Shah, 1918 P.C. 249).

An explanation, normally, should be so read as to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section and should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. It is also possible that an explanation may have been added ex abundanti cautela to allay groundless apprehension.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2021, Q. 2(d) (Syllabus 2017).

It is common to find in statutes “definitions” of certain words and expressions used elsewhere in the body of the statute. The object of such a definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing all the subject-matter to which the word or expression so defined is intended to apply. A definition section may borrow definitions from an earlier Act and definitions so borrowed need not be found in the definition section but in some provisions of the earlier Act.

When a word has been defined in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition governs whenever that word is used in the body of the statute.

The definition of a word in the definition section may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive of the same. When a word is defined to 'mean' such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive, whereas where the word defined is declared to 'include' such and such, the definition is prima facie extensive. Further, a definition may be in the form of 'means and includes', where again the definition is exhaustive. On the other hand, if a word is defined 'to apply to and include', the definition is understood as extensive. (Balkrishan v. M. Bhai AIR 1999 MP 86)

A definition section may also be worded in the form 'so deemed to include' which again is an inclusive or extensive definition and such a form is used to bring in by a legal fiction something within the word defined which according to ordinary meaning is not included within it.

When a word has been defined in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition governs whenever that word is used in the body of the statute.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2021, Q. 1(c) (Syllabus 2017).

Mischief Rule was enunciated by the Barons of the Exchequer “that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discerned and considered.

They are (1) What was the Common Law before the making of the Act; (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not provide; (3) What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; and (4) The true reason of the remedy.

The consideration of the “mischief” or “object” of the enactment is common and will often provide the solution to a problem of interpretation. The rule directs that the Courts must adopt that construction which “shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”.

But this does not mean that a construction should be adopted which ignores the plain natural meaning of the words or disregard the context and the collection in which they occur.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2018, Q. 6(c) (Syllabus 2017).

Object of Interpretation The object of interpretation has been explained in Halsbury’s Laws of England. It states: “The object of all interpretation of a ‘Written Document’ is to discover the intention of the author, the written declaration of whose mind the document is always considered to be. Consequently, the construction must be as near to the minds and apparent intention of the parties as possible, and as the law will permit. The object of interpretation is to see what is the intention expressed by the words used. The words of the statute are to be interpreted so as to ascertain the mind of the legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words which it has used. According to Salmond, interpretation or construction is the process by which the Court’s seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of the authoritative forms in which it is expressed.

Functions of the Courts in Interpretation The function of the court is to ascertain what the parties meant by the words which they have used; to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, and not of what was intended to have been written; to give effect to the intention as expressed, the expressed meaning being, for the purpose of interpretation, equivalent of the intention. It is not possible to guess at the intention of the parties and substitute the presumed for the expressed intention. The ordinary rules of construction must be applied, although by doing so the real intention of the parties may, in some instances be defeated. Such a course tends to establish a greater degree of certainty in the administration of the law”.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2023, Q. 6A(ii) (Syllabus 2017).

The true place of a preamble in a statute was at one time, the subject of conflicting decisions. In Mills v. Wilkins, (1794) 6 Mad. 62, Lord Hold said: “the preamble of a statute is not part thereof, but contains generally the motives or inducement thereof”. On the other hand, it was said that “the preamble is to be considered, for it is the key to open the meaning of the makers of the Act, and the mischief it was intended to remedy”.

The modern rule lies between these two extremes and is that where the enacting part is explicit and unambiguous the preamble cannot be resorted to, control, qualify or restrict it, but where the enacting part is ambiguous, the preamble can be referred to explain and elucidate it [Raj Mal v. Harnam Singh, (1928) 9 Lah. 260].

In Powell v. Kempton Park Race Course Co., (1899) AC 143, 157, Lord Halsbury said: “Two propositions are quite clear — One that a preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach and another that, if an enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment”. Allahabad High Court has held in Kashi Prasad v. State, AIR 1967 All. 173, that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat the enacting clauses of a statute, it has been treated to be a key for the interpretation of the statute.

Supreme Court in Kamalpura Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080, pointed out that the preamble may be legitimately consulted in case any ambiguity arises in the construction of an Act and it may be useful to fix the meaning of words used so as to keep the effect of the statute within its real scope.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2019, Q. 2(a) (Syllabus 2017).

Where the meaning of the statute is clear there is no need for presumptions. But if the intention of the legislature is not clear, there are a number of presumptions. These are as follows:

(a)That the words in a statute are used precisely and not loosely.

(b)That vested rights, i.e., rights which a person possessed at the time the statute was passed, are not taken away without express words, or necessary implication or without compensation.

(c)That mens rea, i.e., guilty mind is required for a criminal act. There is a very strong presumption that a statute creating a criminal offence does not intend to attach liability without a guilty intent. The general rule applicable to criminal cases is “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” (The act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intent).

(d)That the state is not affected by a statute unless it is expressly mentioned as being so affected.

(e)That a statute is not intended to be inconsistent with the principles of International Law.

Although the judges cannot declare a statute void as being repugnant to International Law, yet if two possible alternatives present themselves, the judges will choose that which is not at variance with it.

(f)That the legislature knows the state of the law.

(g)That the legislature does not make any alteration in the existing law unless by express enactment.

(h)That the legislature knows the practice of the executive and the judiciary.

(i)Legislature confers powers necessary to carry out duties imposed by it.

(j)That the legislature does not make mistake. The Court will not even alter an obvious one, unless it be to correct faulty language where the intention is clear.

(jj)The law compels no man to do that which is futile or fruitless.

(k)Legal fictions may be said to be statements or suppositions which are known, to be untrue, but which are not allowed to be denied in order that some difficulty may be overcome, and substantial justice secured. It is a well settled rule of interpretation that in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate.

(l)Where powers and duties are inter-connected and it is not possible to separate one from the other in such a way that powers may be delegated while duties are retained and vice versa, the delegation of powers takes with it the duties.

(m)The doctrine of natural justice is really a doctrine for the interpretation of statutes, under which the Court will presume that the legislature while granting a drastic power must intend that it should be fairly exercised.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2024, Q. 1(d) (Syllabus 2017).

The expression “presumption” in interpretation would mean that while interpreting a statute or any provision thereof; the courts must deem certain things to be true and correct. In other words, the court must proceed to interpret with the conception of correctness of certain things. Presumptions are guidelines used by the courts in process of interpretation. However, they are only used if there are any ambiguities in language but sometimes even if there are no ambiguities it can be used by the judges.

Where the meaning of the statute is clear, there is no need for presumptions. But if the intention of the legislature is not clear, there are number of presumptions. These are:

(a)That the words in a statute are used precisely and not loosely.

(b)That vested rights, i.e., rights which a person possessed at the time the statute was passed, are not taken away without express words, or necessary implication or without compensation.

(c)That "mens rea", i.e., guilty mind is required for a criminal act. There is a very strong presumption that a statute creating a criminal offence does not intend to attach liability without a guilty intent.

(d)That the state is not affected by a statute unless it is expressly mentioned as being so affected.

(e)That a statute is not intended to be inconsistent with the principles of International Law. Although the judges cannot declare a statute void as being repugnant to International Law, yet if two possible alternatives present themselves, the judges will choose that which is not at variance with it.

(f)That the legislature knows the state of the law.

(g)That the legislature does not make any alteration in the existing law unless by express enactment.

(h)That the legislature knows the practice of the executive and the judiciary.

(i)Legislature confers powers necessary to carry out duties imposed by it.

(j)That the legislature does not make mistake. The Court will not even alter an obvious one, unless it be to correct faulty language where the intention is clear.

(jj)The law compels no man to do that which is futile or fruitless.

(k)Legal fictions may be said to be statements or suppositions which are known, to be untrue, but which are not allowed to be denied in order that some difficulty may be overcome, and substantial justice secured. It is a well settled rule of interpretation that in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate.

(l)Where powers and duties are inter-connected and it is not possible to separate one from the other in such a way that powers may be delegated while duties are retained and vice versa, the delegation of powers takes with it the duties.

(m)The doctrine of natural justice is really a doctrine for the interpretation of statutes, under which the Court will presume that the legislature while granting a drastic power must intend that it should be fairly exercised.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2022, Q. 5(b) (Syllabus 2017).

Where the meaning of the statute is clear, there is no need for presumptions. But if the intention of the legislature is not clear, there are number of presumptions. These are:

(a)that the words in a statute are used precisely and not loosely.

(b)that vested rights, i.e., rights which a person possessed at the time the statute was passed, are not taken away without express words, or necessary implication or without compensation.

(c)that "mens rea", i.e., guilty mind is required for a criminal act. There is a very strong presumption that a statute creating a criminal offence does not intend to attach liability without a guilty intent.

The general rule applicable to criminal cases is "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea" (The act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intent).

(d)that the state is not affected by a statute unless it is expressly mentioned as being so affected.

(e)that a statute is not intended to be inconsistent with the principles of International Law. Although the judges cannot declare a statute void as being repugnant to International Law, yet if two possible alternatives present themselves, the judges will choose that which is not at variance with it.

(f)that the legislature knows the state of the law.

(g)that the legislature does not make any alteration in the existing law unless by express enactment.

(h)that the legislature knows the practice of the executive and the judiciary.

(i)legislature confers powers necessary to carry out duties imposed by it.

(j)that the legislature does not make mistake. The Court will not even alter an obvious one, unless it be to correct faulty language where the intention is clear.

(jj)the law compels no man to do that which is futile or fruitless.

(k)legal fictions may be said to be statements or suppositions which are known, to be untrue, but which are not allowed to be denied in order that some difficulty may be overcome, and substantial justice secured. It is a well settled rule of interpretation that in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate.

(l)where powers and duties are inter-connected and it is not possible to separate one from the other in such a way that powers may be delegated while duties are retained and vice versa, the delegation of powers takes with it the duties.

(m)the doctrine of natural justice is really a doctrine for the interpretation of statutes, under which the Court will presume that the legislature while granting a drastic power must intend that it should be fairly exercised.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2021, Q. 4(d) (Syllabus 2017).

In Halsbury’s Laws of England, it is stated: Parliament intends that an enactment shall remedy a particular mischief and it is therefore presumed that Parliament intends that the court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find a construction which applies the remedy provided by it in such a way as to suppress that mischief. The doctrine originates in Heydon’s case where the Barons of the Exchequer resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:

—what was the common law before the making of the Act; — what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide; — what remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; and — the true reason of the remedy, and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall – – suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and – suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro private commode (for private benefit); and – add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro publico (for the public good).

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2020, Q. 1(d) (Syllabus 2017).

In Halsbury‘s Laws of England, it is stated : “Parliament intends that an enactment shall remedy a particular mischief and it is therefore presumed that Parliament intends that the court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find a construction which applies the remedy provided by it in such a way as to suppress that mischief.”

The doctrine originates in Heydon‘s case where the Barons of the Exchequer resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:

•what was the common law before the making of the Act;

•what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide;

•what remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; and

•the true reason of the remedy and the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall – – suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and – suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro private-commode (for private benefit); and – add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico (for the public good).

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2019, Q. 2A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judge’s trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this, not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature. A judge should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this luck in the texture of it, how would they have straight ended it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2022, Q. 4(a) (Syllabus 2017).

Beneficial construction involves giving the widest meaning possible to the statutes.

When there are two or more possible ways of interpreting a section or a word, the meaning which gives relief and protects the benefits which are purported to be given by the legislation, should be chosen. A beneficial statute has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to fructify the legislative intent. Beneficial construction to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy is generally preferred.

Beneficial Construction of statutes have enormously played an important role in the development and beneficial interpretation of socio – economic legislations and have always encouraged the Indian legislators to make more laws in favor of the people belonging to backward class of people in India.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2019, Q. 2A(iv) (Syllabus 2017).

The rule of ejusdem generis must be applied with great caution because, it implies a departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning or supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be controlled by the fundamental rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be accomplished. The rule requires that specific words are all of one genus, in which case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus.

Whether the rule of ejusdem generis should be applied or not to a particular provision depends upon the purpose and object of the provision which is intended to be achieved.

To apply the rule the following conditions must exist:

(1)The statute contains an enumeration by specific words,

(2)The members of the enumeration constitute a class,

(3)The class is not exhausted by the enumeration,

(4)A general term follows the enumeration,

(5)There is a distinct genus which comprises more than one species, and

(6)There is no clearly manifested intent that the general term be given a broader meaning that the doctrine requires.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2024, Q. 6A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

A statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid "a head on clash” between two sections of the same Act and, "whenever it is possible to do so, to construct provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise” (Raj Krishna v. Pinod Kanungo, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 202 at 203). Where in an enactment, there are two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both.

This is what is known as the “rule of harmonious construction.”

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2021, Q. 6(c) (Syllabus 2017).

'Noscitur a Sociis' means "It is known by its associates". In other words, meaning of a word should be known from its accompanying or associating words. It is not a sound principle in interpretation of statutes, to lay emphasis on one word disjuncted from its preceding and succeeding words. A word in a statutory provision is to be read in collocation with its companion words. The pristine principle based on the maxim 'noscitur a socitis' has much relevance in understanding the import of words in a statutory provision (K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy v. K.P. Ballakuraya, AIR 1999 SC 2143).

The rule states that where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood in their cognate sense. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance, is doubtful that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied.

The same words bear the same meaning in the same statute.

The above mentioned rule will not apply:

(i)When the context excluded that principle.

(ii)If sufficient reason can be assigned, it is proper to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of the Act.

(iii)Where it would cause injustice or absurdity.

(iv)Where different circumstances are being dealt with.

(v)Where the words are used in a different context.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2023, Q. 6(b) (Syllabus 2017).

According to Rule of Reasonable Construction the words of a statute must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat, so as to give a sensible meaning to them.

A provision of law cannot be so interpreted as to divorce it entirely from common sense; every word or expression used in an Act should receive a natural and fair meaning.

It is the duty of a Court in constructing a statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature. If, therefore, giving of literal meaning to a word used by the draftsman particularly in penal statute would defeat the object of the legislature, which is to suppress a mischief, the Court can depart from the dictionary meaning which will advance the remedy and suppress the mischief.

It is only when the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence (Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 830).

Courts can depart from dictionary meaning of a word and give it a meaning which will advance the remedy and suppress the mischief provided the Court does not have to conjecture or surmise. A construction will be adopted in accordance with the policy and object of the statute (Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 S.C. 871).

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2019, Q. 1(d) (Syllabus 2017).

According to Section 23 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to make rules or bye-laws is expressed to be given subject to the condition of the rules or bye-laws being made after previous publication, then the following provisions shall apply, namely:

(1)the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws shall, before making them, publish a draft of the proposed rules or bye-laws for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby;

(2)the publication shall be made in such manner as that authority deems to be sufficient, or, if the condition with respect to previous publication so requires, in such manner as the government concerned prescribes;

(3)there shall be published with the draft a notice specifying a date on or after which the draft will be taken into consideration;

(4)the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws, and, where the rules, or bye-laws are to be made with the sanction, approval or concurrence of another authority, that authority also, shall consider any objection or suggestion which may be received by the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws from any person with respect to the draft before the date so specified;

(5)the publication in the Official Gazette of a rule or bye-law purporting to have been made in exercise of a power to make rules or bye-laws after previous publication shall be conclusive proof that the rule or byelaw has been duly made.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2024, Q. 3(a) (Syllabus 2017).

Section 23 of the General Clauses Act provides that where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to make rules or bye-laws is expressed to be given subject to the condition of the rules or bye-laws being made after previous publication, then the following provisions shall apply, namely,-

(1)the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws shall, before making them, publish a draft of the proposed rules or bye-laws for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby,

(2)the publication shall be made in such manner as that authority deems to be sufficient, or, if the condition with respect to previous publication so requires, in such manner as the government concerned prescribes;

(3)there shall be published with the draft a notice specifying a date on or after which the draft will be taken into consideration;

(4)the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws, and, where the rules, or bye- laws are to be made with the sanction, approval or concurrence of another authority, that authority also, shall consider any objection or suggestion which may be received by the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws from any person with respect to the draft before the date so specified;

(5)the publication in the Official Gazette of a rule or bye-law purporting to have been made in exercise of a power to make rules or bye-laws after previous publication shall be conclusive proof that the rule or bye-law has been duly made.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2022, Q. 4(b) (Syllabus 2017).

According to section 26 of General Clauses Act, 1897, where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

According to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baliah v. Rangachari, AIR 1969 SC 701, a plain reading of section 26 shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of an offender under two enactments, but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2024, Q. 2(b) (Syllabus 2017).

As per section 26 of General Clauses Act, 1897, where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

According to the Supreme Court in Baliah v. Rangachari, AIR 1969 SC 701, a plain reading of section 26 shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of an offender under two enactments, but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2022, Q. 2(d) (Syllabus 2017).

Section 26 of the General Clauses Act 1897, deals with offences punishable under two or more enactments. According to this section, where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same Offence.

The Supreme Court observed in the case of Baliah v. Rangachari, AIR 1969 SC 701, a plain reading of section 26 shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of an offender under two enactments, but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2021, Q. 2A(iv) (Syllabus 2017).

According to Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

According to the Supreme Court in Baliah v. Rangachari, AIR 1969 SC 701, a plain reading of section 26 shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of an offender under two enactments, but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence.

In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.

Shikha cannot be punished twice for the same offense under both the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Banking Regulation Act, as per Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. While she can be prosecuted under both enactments, any conviction and punishment must be confined to one enactment to avoid double jeopardy and ensure compliance with the law.

Section 10 of General Clauses Act, 1897, provides the provisions relating to Computation of time.

Sub section 1 of section 10 states:

Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2024, Q. 6(c) (Syllabus 2022).

Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides the provisions relating to coming into operation of enactments. It states:

Where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent,—

(a)in the case of a Central Act made before the commencement of the Constitution, of the Governor-General, and

(b)in the case of an Act of Parliament, of the President.

Further, unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement.

If the date of enactment is not specified under the legislation, it comes into force in accordance with Section 5 of General Clauses Act, 1897.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2023, Q. 2(c) (Syllabus 2017).

According to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

(a)revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b)affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c)affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

(d)affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

(e)affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2023, Q. 2A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

According to section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, where General Clauses Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of General Clauses Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

(a)revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b)affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or

(c)affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

(d)affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

(e)affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.

Attempt all parts of either Question No. 2 or Question no. 2A

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2022, Q. 1(d) (Syllabus 2017).

Where any Central legislation or any regulation enacted after the commencement of this Act repeals any General Clauses Act 1897 made or yet to be made, unless another purpose exists, the repeal shall not:

—Revive anything not enforced or prevailed during the period at which repeal is effected or; — Affect the prior management of any legislation that is repealed or anything performed or undergone or; — Affect any claim, privilege, responsibility or debt obtained, ensued or sustained under any legislation so repealed or; — Affect any punishment, forfeiture or penalty sustained with regard to any offence committed as opposed to any legislation or — Affect any inquiry, litigation or remedy with regard to such claim, privilege, debt or responsibility and any such inquiry, litigation or remedy may be initiated, continued or initiated and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2019, Q. 6(d) (Syllabus 2017).