Law relating to Limitation

The subject of limitation is dealt with in entry 13, List III of the Constitution of India. The Legislature may, without violating the fundamental rights, enact statutes prescribing limitation within which actions may be brought or varying or changing the existing rules of limitation either by shortening or extending time provided a reasonable time is allowed for enforcement of the existing right of action which would become barred under the amended Statute.

The Statute of Limitation is not unconstitutional since it applies to right of action in future. It is a shield and not a weapon of offence.

The State cannot place any hindrance by prescribing a period of limitation in the way of an aggrieved person seeking to approach the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution. To put curbs in the way of enforcement of Fundamental Rights through legislative action might well be questioned under Article 13(2) of the Constitution. It is against the State action that Fundamental Rights are claimed (Tilokchand Motichand v. H.P. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898).

The Limitation Act does not in terms apply to a proceeding under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution.

But the Courts act on the analogy of the statute of limitation and refuse relief if the delay is more than the statutory period of limitation (State of M.P. v. Bhai Lal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006). Where the remedy in a writ petition corresponds to a remedy in an ordinary suit and latter remedy is subject to bar of a statute of limitation, the Court in its writ jurisdiction adopts in the statute its own rule of procedure and in absence of special circumstances imposes the same limitation in the writ jurisdiction.

If the right to property is extinguished by prescription under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, there is no subsisting right to be enforced under Article 32 of the Constitution. In other case where the remedy only, not the right, is extinguished by limitation the Court will refuse to entertain stale claims on the ground of public policy (Tilokchand Motichand v. H.P. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898).

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2023, Q. 4(b) (Syllabus 2017).

The facts of the given situation are similar to the facts in the case of Valliammai vs. K.P. Murali and Others decided by Supreme Court on 11th September, 2023.

In this case the Supreme Court has referred to the provisions of Article 54 of Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 which stipulates the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance as three years from the date fixed for performance, and in alternative when no date is fixed, three years from the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance has been refused.

In this case, the Supreme Court referred to the case earlier decided in Pachanan Dhara and Others v. Monmatha Nath Maity (2006) 5 SCC 340. The Supreme Court in the referred case had held that for determining the applicability of the first or the second part, the court will have to see whether any time was fixed for the performance of the agreement to sell and if so fixed, whether the suit was filed beyond the prescribed period unless a case for the extension of time or performance was pleaded or established. However, when no time is fixed for performance, the court will have to determine the date on which the plaintiff had notice of refusal on the part of the defendant to perform the contract.

In view of the above mentioned case, it can be said that the limitation period starts when the plaintiff has notice that performance has been refused. The court will have to determine the date on which the plaintiff had notice of refusal on the part of the defendant to perform the contract.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2024, Q. 4(b) (Syllabus 2022).

The test of “sufficient cause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of limitation has left the concept of ‘sufficient cause’ delightfully undefined thereby leaving to the court a well-intended discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such. [R B Ramlingam v. R B Bhvansewari (2009) 2 SCC 689].

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2020, Q. 3(b) (Syllabus 2017).

Period of 30 years : The maximum period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act is 30 years and it is provided only for three kinds of suits:

1.Suits by mortgagors for the redemption or recovery of possession of immovable property mortgaged;

2.Suits by mortgagee for foreclosure;

3.Suits by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government including the State of Jammu and Kashmir or Local authorities.

Period of 12 years : A period of 12 years is prescribed as a limitation period for various kinds of suits relating to immovable property, trusts & trust property, legacy, hereditary offices, execution of decrees and endowments.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2022, Q. 6A(iii) (Syllabus 2017).

Maximum period of limitation - The maximum period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 is 30 years. They are as follows:

1 Suits by mortgagors for the redemption or recovery of possession of immovable property mortgaged; 2 Suits by mortgagee for foreclosure; 3 Suits by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government including the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

4 Suits by or on behalf of any local authority for possession of any public street or road or any part thereof from which it has been dispossessed or of which it has discontinued the possession.

Minimum period of limitation - The minimum period of limitation of 10 days is prescribed for application for leave to appear and defend a suit under summary procedure from the date of service of the summons.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2021, Q. 3(c) (Syllabus 2017).

The time periods of limitation for compensation in defamation are as under:

For compensation for libel: One year from when the libel is published.

For compensation for slander: One year when the words are spoken, or, if the words are not actionable in themselves, when the special damage complained of results.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2023, Q. 1(f) (Syllabus 2022).

(i)The period of limitation is one year and the time from which such period of limitation begins to run is when the words are spoken, or if the words are not actionable in themselves, when the special damage complained of results.

(ii)The period of limitation one year and the time from which such period of limitation begins to run is when the libel is published.

(iii)The period of limitation is one year and the time from which such period of limitation begins to run is when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated.

(iv)The period of limitation is three years and the time from which such period of limitation begins to run is when the right to sue accrues.

(v)The period of limitation is twelve years and the time from which such period of limitation begins to run is when the tenancy is determined.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2025, Q. 5(c) (Syllabus 2022).

The term “time requisite for obtaining a copy” means the time which is reasonably required for obtaining such a copy. On the explanation to Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Supreme Court in the case of Udayan China Bhai v. R.C. Bali, AIR 1977 SC 2319, held that by reading Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 with explanation it is not possible to accept the submission that in computing the time requisite for obtaining copy of a decree by an application made after preparation of the decree, the time that elapsed between the pronouncement of the judgement and the signing of the decree should be excluded.

However, the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy is made shall not be excluded in computing the time for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2022, Q. 2A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

According to Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963, the relief to a person is given when the period of limitation is over, because another civil proceeding related to the matter in issue had been initiated in a court which is unable to entertain it, by lack of jurisdiction or by any other like cause. The following conditions must co-exist for the applicability of this Section:

(a)that the plaintiff or the applicant was prosecuting another civil proceeding against the defendant with due diligence in the above said court;

(b)that the previous suit or application related to the same matter in issue;

(c)that the plaintiff or the applicant prosecuted in good-faith in that court; and

(d)that the court was unable to entertain a suit or application on account of defect of jurisdiction or other like cause.

Thus, referring to above provisions, it can be said that Mohit is entitled to exclusion of time spent in earlier proceedings under the Limitation Act, 1963 provided the conditions laid down in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are satisfied.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2026, Q. 5(a) (Syllabus 2022).

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Act) provides the provisions relating to Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. The relief to a person is given by Section 14 of the Act when the period of limitation is over, because another civil proceedings relating to the matter in issue had been initiated in a court which is unable to entertain it, by lack of jurisdiction or by any other like cause. The following conditions must co-exist for the applicability of this Section:

(a)that the plaintiff or the applicant was prosecuting another civil proceedings against the defendant with due diligence in the above said court;

(b)that the previous suit or application related to the same matter in issue;

(c)that the plaintiff or the applicant prosecuted in good-faith in that court; and

(d)that the court was unable to entertain a suit or application on account of defect of jurisdiction or other like cause.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2024, Q. 2A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

The given problem is based on Sections 16 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In case of death of a person before the right to institute a suit accrues, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of instituting such suit or making such application.

In the given case , the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the minor son attain the age of majority and become eligible/capable of filing a suit or making such application as required under the Law.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2018, Q. 4(b) (Syllabus 2017).

Where the suit or application is based upon the fraud or mistake of the defendant or respondent or his agent or in other cases as mentioned in Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963(the Act), the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered fraud or mistake or could, with reasonable diligence have discovered it or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production.

These rules are subject to certain exceptions as provided in proviso to Section 17(1).

According to section 17(2) of the Act, when a judgment-debtor by fraud or force prevented the execution of a decree or order within the period of limitation, the court may extend the period for execution of the decree or order on the application of Judgement Creditor. Such application shall be made within one year from the date of the 'discovery of the fraud' or the 'cessation of force'.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2023, Q. 6A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the effect of acknowledgement of liability in respect of property or right on the period of limitation. The following requirements should be present for a valid acknowledgement as per Section 18:

—There must be an admission or acknowledgement — Such acknowledgement must be in respect of any property or right — It must be made before the expiry of period of limitation — It must be in writing and signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed.

If all the above requirements are satisfied, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was signed.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2019, Q. 6(c) (Syllabus 2017).

Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the effect of acknowledgement of liability in respect of property or right on the period of limitation. The following requirements should be present for a valid acknowledgement as per Section 18:

•There must be an admission or acknowledgement.

•Such acknowledgement must be in respect of any property or right.

•It must be made before the expiry of period of limitation.

•It must be in writing and signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed.

If all the above requirements are satisfied, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was signed.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2021, Q. 6(c) (Syllabus 2017).

As per Section 19 of the Limitation Act where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made. The proviso says that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgement of the payment must appear in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by the person making the payment.

According to the explanation appended to Section 19:

(a)where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment;

(b)‘debt’ does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court for the purpose of this Section.

Thus, according to section 19 a fresh period of limitation becomes available to the creditor when part-payment of debt is made by the debtor before the expiration of the period of limitation.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2020, Q. 6(c) (Syllabus 2017).

The law relating to limitation is incorporated in the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes different periods of limitation for suits, petitions or applications.

In the case of Bombay Dying & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328 the Supreme Court held that the Law of limitation bars the remedy in a Court of law only when the period of limitation has expired, but it does not extinguish the right that it cannot be enforced by judicial process. Thus if a claim is satisfied outside the Court of law after the expiry of period of limitation, that is not illegal.

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that any suit, appeal or application if made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it is the duty of the Court not to proceed with such suits irrespective of the fact whether the plea of limitation has been set up in defence or not. The provisions of Section 3 are mandatory. The Court can suo motu take note of question of limitation. The question whether a suit is barred by limitation should be decided on the facts as they stood on the date of presentation of the plaint.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2019, Q. 2A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

The law relating to limitation is incorporated in the Limitation Act of 1963(the Act), which prescribes different periods of limitation for suits, petitions or applications. The Act applies to all civil proceedings and some special criminal proceedings which can be taken in a Court of law unless its application is excluded by any enactment.

The Law of limitation indeed bars the remedy in a Court of law only when the period of limitation has expired, but it does not extinguish the right that it cannot be enforced by judicial process (Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328) Thus, if a claim is satisfied outside the Court of law after the expiry of period of limitation, that is not illegal.

Section 3 of the Act provides that any suit, appeal or application if made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it is the duty of the Court not to proceed with such suits irrespective of the fact whether the plea of limitation has been set up in defense or not. The provisions of Section 3 are mandatory. The Court can suo motu take note of the question of limitation. The question whether a suit is barred by limitation should be decided on the facts as they stood on the date of presentation of the plaint. It is a vital section upon which the whole limitation Act depends for its efficacy. The effect of Section 3 is not to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction. Therefore, the decision of a Court allowing a suit which had been instituted after the period prescribed is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction. A decree passed in a time barred suit is not a nullity.

In the case of Noharlal Verma vs. District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur, (SC), 2008, the Supreme Court observed that, if the statute stipulates a particular period of limitation, no concession or order would make an application barred by time to be within the limitation and the authority had no jurisdiction to consider such application on merits.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2024, Q. 4A(iii) (Syllabus 2022).

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963(the Act) provides that any suit, appeal or application if made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it is the duty of the Court not to proceed with such suits irrespective of the fact whether the plea of limitation has been set up in defence or not. The provisions of Section 3 of the Act are mandatory. The Court can suo motu take note of question of limitation. The question whether a suit is barred by limitation should be decided on the facts as they stood on the date of presentation of the plaint.

It is a vital section upon which the whole limitation Act depends for its efficacy.

The Court is under an obligation to dismiss a suit if it is filed beyond the time prescribed by the Limitation Act. The provisions of Section 3 are mandatory and the Court will not proceed with the suit if it is barred by time. Under Section 3 of the Act, it is clearly mentioned that every suit instituted, appeal preferred and the application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed. Even though limitation has not been set up as a defence.

However, the effect of Section 3 is not to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction. Therefore, decision of a Court allowing a suit which had been instituted after the period prescribed is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction. A decree passed in a time barred suit is not a nullity.

In case of Noharlal Verma vs. District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur, (SC), 2008, the Supreme Court observed that, if the statute stipulates a particular period of limitation, no concession or order would make an application barred by time to be within the limitation and the authority had no jurisdiction to consider such application on merits.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2023, Q. 2(d) (Syllabus 2017).

Bar of Limitation Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that any suit, appeal or application if made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it is the duty of the Court not to proceed with such suits irrespective of the fact whether the plea of limitation has been set up in defence or not. The provisions of Section 3 of the Act are mandatory. The Court can suo motu take note of the question of limitation. The question whether a suit is barred by limitation should be decided on the facts as they stood on the date of presentation of the plaint. It is a vital section upon which the whole Limitation Act depends for its efficacy.

The effect of Section 3 of the Act is not to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction. Therefore, decision of a court allowing a suit which had been instituted after the period prescribed is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction. A decree passed in a time barred suit is not a nullity.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2021, Q. 2A(ii) (Syllabus 2017).

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963(Limitation Act) allows the extension of prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay. This is known as doctrine of "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay which is embodied in Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Applicability Section 5 provides that any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

It is clarified by the explanation appended to Section 5 that the fact that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgement of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be a sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. The prescribed period means any period prescribed by any law for the time being in force.

Non-applicability Section 5 is not applicable to applications made under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and also to suits. The Court has no power to admit a time barred suit even if there is a sufficient cause for the delay. It applies only to appeals or applications as specified therein. The reason for non- applicability of the Section to suits is that, the period of limitation allowed in most of the suits extends from 3 to 12 years whereas in appeals and application it does not exceed 6 months. For the applicability of Section 5, the “prescribed period” should be over.

The party applying for condonation of delay should satisfy the Court for not making an appeal or application within the prescribed period for sufficient cause. The term sufficient cause has not been defined in the Limitation Act. It depends on the circumstances of each case.

However, it must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party. In Ramlal v.

Rewa Coal Fields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, the Supreme Court held that once the period of limitation expires then the appellant has to explain the delay made thereafter for day by day and if he is unable to explain the delay even for a single day, it would be deemed that the party did not have sufficient cause for delay.

It is the Court’s discretion to extend or not to extend the period of limitation even after the sufficient cause has been shown and other conditions are also specified. However, the Court should exercise its discretion judicially and not arbitrarily.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2023, Q. 2(a) (Syllabus 2017).

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 allows the extension of prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay. This is known as doctrine of “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay which is embodied in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 provides that any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

It is clarified by the explanation appended to Section 5 that the fact that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgement of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be a sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.

Thus, the Court may admit an application or appeal even after the expiry of the specified period of limitation if it is satisfied with the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be as to sufficient cause for not making it within time.

The Section is not applicable to applications made under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and also to suits. The Court has no power to admit a time barred suit even if there is a sufficient cause for the delay. It applies only to appeals or applications as specified therein. The reason for non- applicability of the Section to suits is that, the period of limitation allowed in most of the suits extends from 3 to 12 years whereas in appeals and application it does not exceed 6 months. For the applicability of Section 5, the “prescribed period” should be over. The prescribed period means any period prescribed by any law for the time being in force.

The party applying for condonation of delay should satisfy the Court for not making an appeal or application within the prescribed period for sufficient cause. The term sufficient cause has not been defined in the Limitation Act. It depends on the circumstances of each case.

However, it must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2025, Q. 6A(ii) (Syllabus 2022).

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act) allows the extension of prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay. This is known as doctrine of “sufficient cause”

for condonation of delay. Section 5 provides that any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

The provisions related to persons under legal disability are given in Sections 6-8. Section 6 is an enabling section to enable persons under disability to exercise their legal rights within a certain time.

Section 7 supplements Section 6, Section 8 controls these sections, which serves as an exception to Sections 6 and 7. The combined effect of Sections 6 and 8 is that where the prescribed period of limitation expires before the cessation of disability, for instance, before the attainment of majority, the minor will no doubt be entitled to a fresh period of limitation from the attainment of his majority subject to the condition that in no case the period extended by Section 6 shall by virtue of Section 8 exceeds three years from cessation of disability, i.e., cessation of minority.

Sections 6, 7 and 8 must be read together. Section 8 imposes a limitation on concession provided under Sections 6 and 7 to a person under disability up to a maximum of three years after the cessation of disability. The Section applies to all suits except suits to enforce rights of pre-emption.

The period of three years under Section 6 of this Act has to be counted, not from the date of attainment of majority by the person under disability, but from the date of cessation of minority or disability.

In the given situation, the dispute arose when Aman was 8 years old. Aman wants to file a civil suit for the recovery of possession of the immovable property against Manish. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 allows the extension of prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay. According to Section 6 where the prescribed period of limitation expires before the cessation of disability, for instance, in this given situation before the attainment of majority, the minor will no doubt be entitled to a fresh period of limitation from cessation of minority subject to the condition that in no case the period extended shall by virtue of Section 8 exceeds three years from cessation of disability, i.e., cessation of minority.

Hence, Aman can only get 3 years from cessation of disability, i.e., cessation of minority to file a civil suit by virtue of Section 8 of the Limitation Act. Hence, Aman must file a suit within 3 years of his cessation of minority.

Section 7 deals with the situation where there is joint entitlement of filling a suit or application. It gives rise to two situations:

1.When discharge may be given by any other person without concurrence- In this situation, time will run against them all.

2.When discharge cannot be given by any other person without concurrence- In this situation, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2024, Q. 3(b) (Syllabus 2022).

Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is an enabling Section to enable persons under disability to exercise their legal rights within a certain time. Section 7 supplements Section 6 and Section 8 controls these Sections, which serves as an exception to Section 6 and 7. Hence, under Limitation Act minority or disability falls within Special exceptions which imposes limitation on concessions under Section 6 and 7 to the person under disability includes minority up to maximum of the 3 years as the period of limitation for any suit or application after cessation of minority or disability.

This exception applies to all suits except suits to enforce rights of pre-emption. Further the period of three years has been counted, not from the date of attainment of majority by the person under disability, but from the date of cessation of minority/ disability.

Thus, Akash can file suit on cessation of minority.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2023, Q. 4(a) (Syllabus 2022).

Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified there for in the Schedule of the Act.

Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to that person had he not died.

Section 6 of the Act is an enabling section to enable persons under disability to exercise their legal rights within a certain time. Section 7 which deals with disability of one of several persons supplements Section 6, Section 8 deals with special exception controls sections 6 and 7 , which serves as an exception to Sections 6 and 7. The combined effect of Sections 6 and 8 is that where the prescribed period of limitation expires before the cessation of disability, for instance, before the attainment of majority, the minor will no doubt be entitled to a fresh period of limitation from the attainment of his majority subject to the condition that in no case the period extended by Section 6 shall by virtue of Section 8 exceeds three years from cessation of disability, i.e. attainment of majority.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2019, Q. 2A(iii) (Syllabus 2017).

Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Act) should be understood in contrast with Sections 6, 7 and 8, which deal with the effect of disability on the running of limitation. Together, these provisions explain when limitation can be suspended and when it cannot.

According to Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application can stop it provided that where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.

This means that Sections 7 and 8 operate only if the disability exists at the time when limitation begins.

Once limitation has started running, any later arising disability, such as insanity, imprisonment, or minority, Will not stop or suspend the running of time.

Hence, Section 9 acts as an exception to Sections 7 and 8, by clearly stating that the benefit of disability is available only if the disability exists at the commencement of limitation, and not if it arises later.

The rule of this Section is based on the English dictum. “Time when once it has commenced to run in any case will not cease to be so by reason of any subsequent event”. Thus, when any of the statutes of limitation is begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability will stop this running.

The applicability of this Section is limited to suits and applications only and does not apply to appeals unless the case fell within any of the exceptions provided in the Act itself.

For the applicability of Section 9, it is essential that the cause of action or the right to move the application must continue to exist and subsisting on the date on which a particular application is made. If a right itself had been taken away by some subsequent event, no question of bar of limitation will arise as the starting point of limitation for that particular application will be deemed not to have been commenced.

Thus, time runs when the cause of action accrues. True test to determine when a cause of action has accrued is to ascertain the time, when plaintiff could have maintained his action to a successful result first if there is an infringement of a right at a particular time, the whole cause of action will be said to have arisen then and there.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2025, Q. 6A(iii) (Syllabus 2022).

According to Section 9 of the Limitation Ac, 1963, where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application can stop it provided that where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover debt shall be suspended while the administration continues. The rule of this Section is based on the English dictum. “Time when once it has commenced to run in any case will not cease to be so by reason of any subsequent event”. Thus, when any of the statutes of limitation is begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability will stop this running.

The applicability of this Section is limited to suits and applications only and does not apply to appeals unless the case fell within any of the exceptions provided in the Act itself.

For the applicability of Section 9, it is essential that the cause of action or the right to move the application must continue to exist and subsisting on the date on which a particular application is made. If a right itself had been taken away by some subsequent event, no question of bar of limitation will arise as the starting point of limitation for that particular application will be deemed not to have been commenced.

Thus, time runs when the cause of action accrues. True test to determine when a cause of action has accrued is to ascertain the time, when plaintiff could have maintained his action to a successful result first if there is an infringement of a right at a particular time, the whole cause of action will be said to have arisen then and there.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, June 2024, Q. 2A(i) (Syllabus 2017).

According to Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963(the Act), where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application can stop it.

Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.

The applicability of this Section is limited to suits and applications only and does not apply to appeals unless the case fell within any of the exceptions provided in the Act itself.

For the applicability of Section 9 of the Act, it is essential that the cause of action or the right to move the application must continue to exist and subsisting on the date on which a particular application is made. If a right itself had been taken away by some subsequent event, no question of bar of limitation will arise as the starting point of limitation for that particular application will be deemed not to have been commenced.

Source⁠​‌​‌‌​‌​⁠: ICSI Guideline Answers, December 2022, Q. 2(c) (Syllabus 2017).